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1 Introduction
The oil price hit a low of around USD 10 at the
end of 1999. Since then it has moved upwards in 
a series of steps. In recent years it has been one of the
most closely monitored components of the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), which is a leading inflation indica-
tor. When it topped the USD 50 mark in October 2004
and in March 2005 and, even more clearly, when it
passed USD 60 in mid-2005, it brought back painful
memories of the severe economic consequences of
the 1970s oil crisis. However, in real terms – after
adjusting for inflation – the oil price is still lower now
than it was then. In today’s dollars, the oil price was
over USD 90 in 1980 (Graph 1). 
Another striking factor is that between the mid
1980s and the turn of the millennium the oil price
fluctuated around an average of about USD 20. Since
then, the average price level and volatility have
greatly increased. 
Although a few years do not provide sufficient
evidence to validate a trend, they do raise questions
about the background to the oil price hike and its
implications for monetary policy. This paper looks at
the fundamental factors which suggest that oil prices
are likely to remain both high and volatile. It also
discusses the implications for monetary policy. Since
maintaining price stability is the principal objective
of monetary policy, this paper focuses primarily on
the impact of oil prices on inflation; the effects on
growth are considered insofar as they affect infla-
tion. Section 2 outlines some of the reasons why oil
prices are expected to remain high and volatile.
Section 3 looks at forecasting oil prices while Section
4 outlines the possible implications of higher oil
prices for economic growth and inflation. Finally,
Section 5 examines the monetary policy implications
of sustained high oil prices. The final section presents
our conclusions. 
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2 Reasons for an era of 
high and volatile oil prices 
The price of oil is essentially determined by four
factors: general demand and supply factors (2.1),
geopolitical factors (2.2), geological factors (2.3)
and financial market factors (2.4). For a variety of
reasons, it seems likely that in the foreseeable future1
oil prices will remain both high and volatile.2
2.1 Demand and supply
Factor 1: Reversed causality: 
demand-driven oil prices
In the 1980s, the link between oil prices and
economic cycles was still dominated by the unilateral
impact of oil prices on the economy. However, today
the increasing importance of demand for oil has
reversed this situation: demand for oil and thus the
price of oil are increasingly dependent on the global
economy. To some extent, a rise in oil prices is a 
normal by-product of a global economic upswing.
Recently, this has been strengthened by the extremely
high growth momentum in China, which is now the
world’s second largest oil importer and oil consumer
after the USA. It should be stressed that this is not 
a temporary phenomenon. On the contrary, the
integration of China and India into the global econo-
my most likely represents a rare structural shift
whose economic implications are comparable to the
integration of the USA in the global economy in the
nineteenth century.
Demand has become a far more important
factor in the past ten years
The graph of world GDP versus the oil price
shows a gradual shift in the mid-1990s. Prior to the
mid-1990s, the correlation was negative, and, since,
it has been positive (Graph 2).3
According to the International Energy Agency
(IEA, 2005), global demand for oil rose by 2.6 million
barrels a day in 2004. That was a rise of 3% compared
with the previous year and the sharpest hike for nearly
25 years. The IEA forecasts that in 2005 demand will
rise further by 1.4 million barrels per day (about
1.7%) to around 84 million barrels per day. In view of
the limits on production capacity, demand has thus
become one of the key oil price drivers. Almost half 
of the rise in demand is attributable to emerging 
markets in Asia, with China alone accounting for
nearly one third of the increase (Table 1). 
1 The factors outlined in this section are essentially long-term 
in nature even though their impact may vary over time. For instance, 
Factor 3 (investment) will become more important than Factor 2 
(low oil stocks) over time. 
2 Statistically, the structural break in the volatility of oil prices has 
not been significant so far. This section outlines various reasons why its
significance could rise once more observations are available.  
3 The correlation was –0.4 before 1995 and has been +0.3 since. This
linear representation is merely a rough approximation. Non-linear 
methods are normally used for accurate quantification (cf. Hooker, 1999;
Hamilton, 2003). Moreover, the structural shift did not take place in 
a single year; it was a gradual process of transition. 
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With China and India, two very large economies
have emerged as oil importers. Moreover, their
potential indicates that in both countries economic
momentum is merely in its infancy. Economies tend
to be particularly dependent on oil in the initial
development phase. 
This trend has been cushioned to some extent
by the reduced oil intensity of production processes
in the industrialised countries. Nevertheless, North
America accounted for a fifth of the rise in global
demand for oil in 2004 (Table 1), making it the 
main demand driver along with the Asian countries
(Graph 3). The higher relevance of demand does not
only explain the hike in the oil price, it also shows
why it has become more volatile. Cyclical fluctuations
are by nature more volatile than fluctuations in struc-
tural, supply-side factors.
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Global oil demand by region
Graph 2:
During the 1990s the correlation between oil prices and GDP 
growth switched from negative to positive.
Sources: Bloomberg, Oxford Economic Forecast (OEF)
Table 1:
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), 2005
Graph 3:
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), 2004
  
(million barrels per day) 
 Demand Annual Change Annual Change (%)
2004 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
North America 25.19  0.47 0.61 0.36  2.0 2.5 1.4 
Europe 16.44  0.20 0.24 0.11  1.2 1.5 0.7 
OECD Pacific 8.63  0.14 -0.15 0.00  1.6 -1.7 0.0 
China 6.38  0.55 0.86 0.50  11.0 15.6 7.9 
Other Asia 8.57  0.22 0.47 0.24  2.8 5.7 2.8 
Subtotal Asia 23.57  0.91 1.18 0.75  4.2 5.3 3.2 
FSU 3.71  0.12 0.13 0.05  3.5 3.7 1.4 
Middle East 5.88  0.20 0.32 0.29  3.7 5.7 4.9 
Africa 2.81  0.04 0.07 0.09  1.7 2.4 3.3 
Latin America 4.90  -0.10 0.17 0.12  -2.0 3.7 2.4 
World 82.50  1.84 2.72 1.77  2.4 3.4 2.1 
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Gradual price rise
The way in which the oil price has risen is 
further evidence of the increasing significance of
demand-side pressure. Prices rise in response to
either a shortage of supply 4 or an increase in demand.
However, while a reduction in supply, as occurred 
in the 1970s, affects prices immediately, an increase
in demand, as has been the case since 2000, only
gradually lifts prices.  
Factor 2: Low stocks
Global competition increases pressure to cut
production costs. Wide-ranging action has been
taken in recent years to trim costs, and, as a result,
global stocks have gradually been scaled back. With
the increasing risk of rising oil prices, stocks have
regained their attractiveness. Since 2004, oil stocks
in the USA have been recovering from a 30-year low
(Graph 4). This gradual increase in stocks is another
factor boosting demand. 
China has played a pivotal role in this issue as
well, as its demand was severely underestimated in
recent years. In the general low price environment 
of the late 1990s, an increase in oil stocks in the
industrialised countries would have had relatively
little impact on oil prices. However, in conjunction
with an unexpected hike in oil demand from China,
the same increase in oil stocks caused prices to spiral. 
Factor 3: Turning point in investment 
cycle of oil facilities
Oil is formed from deposits of plants and micro-
organisms on the ocean bed. It is generated over mil-
lions of years as a result of heat, pressure and the
absence of air. The cost of extracting oil varies con-
siderably among different regions. However, drilling
costs only account for a comparatively small propor-
tion of the overall cost of the end-product (after
transportation and refining). There is some doubt
whether this will hold true for the future. Investment
in oil rigs has been seriously neglected in some cases,
and the necessary replacement investment is likely to
push up oil end-prices. According to the IEA (2005),
the energy sector needs to invest around USD 16 tril-
lion by 2030. The rise in oil prices has increased the
profitability of investments in infrastructure, which
should lead to downward pressure on oil prices in the
longer term. However, this would require that deci-
sions made in the oil-producing countries be depoliti-
cised and that the increase in infrastructure invest-
ment actually lead to higher oil supply. In addition,
because they lift the profitability of investment, 
rising oil prices also increase the value of oil reserves
and thus the incentive to cap supply. Only when oil
prices reach a level that makes switching to alterna-
tive energy sources a viable prospect, will oil produc-
ers have a direct economic incentive to exploit the
technical capacity of their infrastructure to the full.
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US crude oil inventories are only gradually recovering from their low point.
Source: Bloomberg
4  Hurricane Katrina provides renewed evidence of the high short-term
vulnerability of oil supplies.
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Factor 4: Differences in the efficiency 
of oil use
In the OECD countries, the oil intensity of the
manufacturing industry and the consumer sector has
halved since the oil shocks of the 1970s. Thus, in
some countries it has become more and more difficult
to put into effect further savings. At the same time,
the emerging markets have made virtually no
progress towards raising the efficiency with which
they use oil (Graph 5). In particular, the amount 
of oil consumed by China is out of proportion to its
output. This may be due in part to the type of indus-
try, since heavy industry with genereally less energy-
efficient technologies is most prevalent. Another
explanation of the unusual ratio of oil imports to GDP
is that domestic households use oil to run inefficient
diesel generators.5
2.2 Geopolitical factors 
Factor 5: Simultaneous and unrelated events
have increased geopolitical insecurity and
raised concern about the domestic policy of
key oil-producing countries
The oil market has always been highly political.
Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001
and the second Iraq war, geopolitical insecurity
increased sharply, especially in the main oil-producing
countries. Even if there are no further terrorist attacks,
the fear triggered by the attacks to date is sufficient to
exert upward pressure on oil prices and increase their
volatility. Moreover, it should be remembered that
since the turn of the millennium political unrest has
not been confined to a specific region. Instead there
have been an increasing number of simultaneous yet
completely unrelated political crises. The oil market has
not simply been affected by the altered situation in the
Middle East. At almost exactly the same time it has
been exposed to concerns about Venezuela, Nigeria
and Russia. Here too, uncertainty alone is enough to
boost prices. 
Some political observers believe they can make
out a worrying trend. Since the 1990s the world has
been exposed to a political shock with international
repercussions roughly every two years. The first attack
on the World Trade Center in 1993 was followed in 1995
by terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and on the Moscow
embassy. This was followed by the attacks in Kenya in
1998, on the World Trade Center in September 2001
and in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. This list of
some of the major terrorist attacks suggests that this is
a persistent problem to which there is neither a rapid
nor a simple solution, thus further fuelling the general
sense of insecurity. Here too, circumstances mitigate in
favour of a further increase in both the level and
volatility of oil prices. A market in which (volatile
short-term) fears are gaining the upper hand over
(long-term) fundamentals is particularly susceptible to
volatility. The fact that last year’s terrorist attacks in
Madrid and this year’s attacks in London did not have
any major impact on the financial markets suggests
that such fears had already been priced in.
Figure 3. Oil intensity of production has fallen in the OECD area
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Oil intensity (oil use per unit of output)
Source: Brook et al., 2004
5 At the start of 2005, diesel accounted for about half of Chinese
demand for oil (IEA, 2005). According to the OECD (2004), an increase in
economic growth in China would lift the oil price in the next 25 years by
about twice as much as an equivalent rise in GDP in the OECD countries.
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Factor 6: Globalisation 
Globalisation leads to an increased and faster
transmission of shocks. Such a thing as a closed
economy no longer exists. Evidently, this entails
opportunities – such as the prospect that China will
becoming a major driving force of economic growth in
the long term – as well as risks. As economic inter-
dependence increases, crises, whether local or global
in nature, have a faster and more widespread effect
than in the past. 
Moreover, globalisation increases transport
activities, which are the main purpose for which oil is
used. The OECD (2004) expects the transport sector
to be responsible for three-quarters of the increase in
demand for oil in the period up to 2030. 
Factor 7: Institutional change
In an environment of heightened insecurity, 
a strong institution such as OPEC could ease market
fears. OPEC and especially the Middle East states have
by far the largest oil reserves in the world.6 The IEA
predicts that the Middle East will raise its market
share from 25% to around 40% in the next 30 years.
In view of this, many market commentators assume
that OPEC’s influence will increase in the long term.
Nevertheless, it is worth asking how effectively OPEC
can control the price of oil in a market which is 
driven by demand and is also exposed to speculative
interests. Some market observers feel that OPEC’s
hold on oil prices has declined steadily since the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. For example, the reduction 
in oil production following the sharp drop in oil prices
in late 1997 and 1999 and the staggered increase in
output triggered by the record prices in summer 2004
only had a minor impact on prices. Additionally,
OPEC’s policy of holding production below the agreed
floor could also have an unsettling effect. Thus it is
argued that on the institutional side there is no
immediate sign in the foreseeable future of a trend
that could ease market tension.
As the experience of the 1970s shows, high oil
prices trigger rationalization and substitution, to
reduce dependence on oil.7 Therefore persistently
high oil prices could – contrary to widespread expec-
tations – undermine OPEC’s market power or reduce
the speed at which it extends its influence, as hap-
pened in the 1970s.8
Besides, the oil price may have been kept com-
paratively low so far for institutional reasons. This
can be demonstrated by the Hotelling rule, which
states that in the long term the price of a non-renew-
able resource rises at least as fast as the price of a
financial asset that generates a long-term return.9
Obviously, this seems to conflict with the situation in
the late 1990s when oil prices were at a record low.
Contrary to the rule, at that time large quantities of
oil were produced although selling prices were very
low. In fact, the Hotelling rule only applies in perfect
markets and thus seems unlikely to apply to those
parts of the oil market where oligopolistic structures
hold sway. As decisions on exploiting oil reserves
become more democratic, the Hotelling rule is likely
to become more relevant. Analogously to a floor
option, the floor for the long-term return on oil is
therefore likely to be around the same level as long-
term interest rates. 
6 According to the IEA/OECD (2004), about two-thirds of the world’s
known oil reserves are in OPEC countries.
7 Just as the coal era ended long before reserves were exhausted, 
so the oil era could end before the oil sources dry up, as the relative
profitability of alternative energy sources increases.
8 The OECD (2004) estimates that a USD 5 dollar rise in the oil price
compared with its reference scenario of USD 35 would reduce OPEC’s
market price by around 7% to just over 30% by 2030.  
9 Owners of exhaustible resources maximise their profits either by
extracting the resource now and investing the profits in interest-bearing
instruments or by waiting until shortages raise the price of the resource.
The Hotelling rule (Hotelling, 1931) shows the equilibrium at which the
price increase compensates for the foregone interest. 
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2.3 Geological factors
Factor 8: Uncertainty about oil reserves
Estimates of known oil reserves and expected
new finds vary enormously – often due to differences
in the way reserves are defined. Currently, there are
no standard criteria. Despite their inside knowledge,
even the oil companies publish widely differing fore-
casts and estimates of their present reserves.10 This
reduces market transparency and therefore tends to
push up prices. Moreover, such estimates are often
politically coloured.
The OECD (Brook et al, 2004) puts current
reserves at 1,000 billion barrels. Assuming output
does not change and no further reserves are tapped,
these reserves would be exhausted in about 40 years.
As a result, some analysts take a pessimistic view.11
However, so far rising demand for oil has been
covered by newly discovered reserves and the ratio of
reserves to output has therefore remained constant
over the past two decades.12 Since this cannot be seen
as a guarantee of future developments, the range 
of estimates and scenarios is expected to remain
extremely wide. Regardless how sound one believes
some of the estimates to be, they can have a direct
impact on oil prices as soon as the market becomes
exposed to speculation; the assumption that other
market participants could act on the basis of certain
forecasts is sufficient.
10 For example, in the 1970s BP believed that global output would peak
in 1985 while Shell did not expect this to happen until 1999. Not only 
do forecasts differ according to analyst and timing, but even estimates
of current reserves vary substantially. For instance, at the start of 2004
Shell attracted a good deal of attention by cutting its reserves estima-
tion by 20%. Although Shell merely took this step to bring its estimation
methods in line with the guidelines issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in the United States, it triggered great uncertainty.
The ensuing discussion raised doubts about the reliability of all reserves
estimations issued by the market, which subsequently led to higher
prices.
11 Marvin King Hubbert is one of the best-known oil analysts who take 
a very critical stance on future oil market trends. In 1956 he published 
a famous forecast that oil output in the USA would begin to decline after
1972. Since output was rising quickly at the time, that was a bold state-
ment which gave rise to considerable debate. However, he was quite
right. From 1970 the USA shifted from a net exporter to a net importer
of oil. Some analysts use Hubbart’s geology and mathematics-based
forecasting method nowadays to forecast when global oil production will
peak. On this basis, output will peak between 2003 and 2008 (“Hubbart’s
peak”). This forecast underlies the basic assumption that global con-
sumption is 2% on average and that reserves decline by 6%.
12 The largest reserves are in the Middle East, and new troves of oil
have led to substantial revisions of the estimates. In 1944 reserves in
this region were put at 16 billion barrels. However, estimates had risen
to 116 billion barrels by 1975 and now stand at around 685 billion 
barrels (cf. Adelman, 1995).  
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2.4 The financial market
Factor 9: Oil as a financial underlying
The increased volatility in oil prices attracted
new investors to the market. The resultant increase in
liquidity has in turn made the market more attractive.
The number of traders who are interested in oil as 
a financial instrument, rather than the fuel itself has
risen significantly in recent years. 
The price hike over the last two years was thus
driven also by financial market expectations. Most
observers felt that the price increase exceeded the
level justified by the market situation at the time. In
the first quarter of 2004, OPEC representatives put
the speculation premium at USD 5 per barrel. In the
third quarter of 2004, various market commentators
put the premium at USD 8–10.13 In its quarterly
report, the BIS (2004) saw a high correlation (0.8)
between the weekly change in the oil price and the
changes in long positions held by non-commercial
traders. 
Given the unreliability of the available data, it is
very difficult to estimate what proportion of 
a price rise is due to speculation. The only thing that
is certain is that a tight market situation provides an
incentive to speculate on higher prices.14
One reason why oil became an object of specula-
tion at the start of this millennium was the greater
dependence on demand (Factor 1), which increased
the band within which prices fluctuated to a level
that speculators found interesting. Additionally,
investing in oil may have become more attractive
because of the lack of alternatives. Following the end
of the “new economy” boom, investors were looking
for new opportunities. At the start of 1999 oil prices
had dropped to a 25-year low and thus attracted little
attention. Together with signs that demand for raw
materials was gaining momentum, traders saw these
low oil prices as an ideal basis for launching oil as 
a financial instrument. 
Factor 10: Expectations that the dollar 
will weaken
The OPEC member states control nearly 80% of
the world’s known oil reserves and currently serve
about 40% of global demand. Since 2001 OPEC has set
a target band of USD 22–28 a barrel.15 Given the Unit-
ed States’ record current account deficit, many mar-
ket observers assume that the dollar will depreciate
in the long run. Thus, in the long term, expectations
that the dollar might fall could prompt OPEC to set 
a higher target band in dollars in order to offset 
the resulting deterioration in the terms of trade.
Between the start of 2001 and mid-2005 the dollar
dropped about a third against the euro. A correspon-
ding adjustment to the band would probably bring
the price to USD 29–37. In response to the recent 
oil price trends, OPEC announced that it would tem-
porarily suspend the target band in 2005.
13 For an overview of the literature on speculation and its impact on oil
prices see Weiner (2002).
14 The significance of speculation versus the other factors should not
be overestimated. For example, Weiner (2002) concludes that speculation
only has a marginal impact on oil prices.
15 Based on a OPEC oil price basket – which was changed 
in mid-2005 – and usually is slightly below the price for the very light 
West Texas Intermediate crude oil. 
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3 Oil price forecasts
The previous section outlined various factors
which indicate that oil prices will rise and volatility
will increase. In view of the considerable uncertainty
regarding all of these factors, any oil price forecast is
likely to have a high standard deviation, restricting
its significance. Therefore many observers confine
their forecasts to qualitative statements – for exam-
ple, to the general statement that the oil price will
rise as strongly as demand allows. Despite the high
forecast uncertainty, monetary policy makers need to
make specific assumptions about future oil price
trends for their GDP and inflation forecasts and have
to consider its likely impact early. In this chapter
some quantitative forecasting approaches are out-
lined briefly. Afterwards we look at the usage of oil
price forecasts in macro-economic models.
3.1 Quantitative approaches to 
forecasting oil prices
Economic forecasts are based on the principle
that assumptions about the future can be derived
from the past. However, in the case of oil, various
empirical analyses have come to the conclusion 
that neither the extent of past price changes nor the
duration of high-price phases provides any indication
of when such phases are likely to end. 
In the short term, various market indices can 
be taken as an indicator of how oil prices are likely 
to develop. Thus, forecasts may be based on per-
formance spreads between stock market indices 
with different levels of exposure to energy stocks
(e.g. Canadian market indices which contain a high
proportion of oil securities versus German indices
where energy only represents a small percentage) 
or the valuation of shares in oil companies. By con-
trast, market observers who take a longer-term view
generally use a combination of two parameters: 
a measure of economic activity and an indicator of oil
inventories.  
3.1.1 Forecasts based on futures 
contracts
Oil price forecasts are often based on exchange-
traded futures contracts. After all, who could be
better placed to assess future prices than investors
who stake money on tomorrow’s prices? Using for-
ward rate contracts or futures to forecast tomorrow’s
spot price is a popular method of forecasting prices
for anything from shares and exchange rates to
commodities, for the latter with varying degree of
success. While futures on gold tend to behave similarly
to equities – meaning, futures prices are above their
spot price (“contango”) – this rule is increasingly
being breached in the oil market. This means that the
price of oil for delivery in up to a year’s time is below
the current market price. This market situation 
is known as “backwardation”. Normally, arbitragers
would be expected to empty their warehouses at high
spot prices and fill them at lower futures prices, thus
reducing the spread between spot and futures prices.
That would enable them to reap substantial gains.
However, between 2000 and the start of this year,
backwardation was the rule on the oil market (Graphs
6 and 7). What were the reasons for this?  
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Spot rate and long futures
Graph 6: 
Source: OECD, 2005
Graph 7: 
The spot rate is often above 6-month futures (backwardation, monthly).
Source: Bloomberg
Graph 8: 
Backwardation on the oil market is most common when the spot price 
is above the OPEC target. The shaded areas show periods when the spot
price was over USD 25 (OPEC corridor: USD 23–28, mean USD 25).
Source: Bloomberg
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3.1.2 Reasons for backwardation
One explanation of backwardation is that market
conditions hinder arbitrage. Unlike equities, for
instance, arbitrage on the oil market is restricted by
low market liquidity, seasonal fluctuations in supply
and demand, the risk of interrupting the supply chain
and maintenance costs. 
Like other commodity markets, the oil market is
often in backwardation. This is partly because the
oil reserves still in the ground can be seen as free
storage facilities. In other words, the situation is
similar to a put option in the hands of the oil-produc-
ing countries. Furthermore oil is – unlike gold –
essentially a factor of production rather than an
object of speculation, despite its increasing popularity
as a financial instrument. Heating and cars do not
run on options. Consequently, risk aversion tends to
be relatively high: people would rather fill their cars
with expensive petrol today than run the risk that
they could run out of fuel because they speculated
that the price might drop tomorrow.
Besides restricted arbitrage, institutional factors
can influence market expectations and compound
backwardation on the oil market. Thus, backward-
ation mainly occurs in phases when spot prices are
above the average of the OPEC target band. The oil
market was in “contango” in 2001, when the spot
price was around USD 20 and thus below the OPEC
target band of USD 23-28, and tended to backward-
ation as soon as the spot price exceeded the target
band (Graph 8). 
This also follows from the observation that
generally the higher the oil price, the greater the
backwardation (Graph 9). It remains to be seen
whether the latest price record that coincided with 
a “contango” situation is to be seen as a reverse of
this trend on the futures markets.
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Backwardation
Spot price vs. 6-month futures (monthly values, June 1986-September 2004)
Backwardation (Spot price vs. 6-month futures) rises as the spot price rises.
Source: Bloomberg
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3.2 Use in macro-economic models
In macro-economic models as used by central
banks and administrative authorities, futures prices
are often used as an approximation of future oil
prices. For example, in the budget published at the
start of 2005 (CBO, 2005) the Congressional Budget
Office in the US assumes, on the basis of futures
prices, that oil prices will drop by 2009 (Graph 10).
Similarly the Bank of England has stated (2000) that
it still sees the futures market as the best indication of
future oil price trends. 
Therefore, in the long backwardation phase
between 2000 and the start of 2005, oil price trends
were systematically underestimated.16 Futures prices
are thus a controversial indicator of long-term spot
prices. Haubrich, Higgins and Miller (2004) claim that
while the oil futures market may be useful for hedging
or speculative activities, it is not very suitable as 
a basis for forecasting. Although the drawbacks of
using futures prices for forecasting purposes have
become evident in recent years, there is currently 
no superior alternative available.17 Thus, at the SNB,
futures prices also serve as a basis for oil price
assumptions, which – in addition to other factors –
are taken into account as external variables in making
the quarterly inflation forecasts. Nevertheless, they
do have to be treated with a good deal of caution. 
Furthermore, information on the futures market
should not simply be used as an indicator of point
forecasts; it should also be used as a gauge for fore-
cast uncertainty.18
4 Pass-through channels
As outlined in section 2, several factors indicate
that in the medium term the oil price will remain high
and probably also more volatile. Oil prices impact the
economy in a variety of ways. First, economic growth
is dampened by higher oil prices – in the short term
through demand and in the longer term through
supply-side effects. Moreover, the direct and indirect
effects of higher oil prices are reflected – at least
temporarily – in higher inflation.19
4.1 The oil price and economic growth
As outlined in the introduction, this paper
focuses on implications of higher oil prices on mon-
etary policy and thus on the pass-through effect to
inflation. Since the inflationary impact is deter-
mined, in part, by the implications for economic
growth, the growth effects are outlined briefly here.
The expected economic consequences of higher
oil prices are mainly dependent on the duration of
the shock, the assumed monetary policy response
and the assumed oil intensity of an economy. Here,
we look in particular at the impact of unexpectedly
sharp price increases (oil shocks).
Demand and supply
In the short term, an oil price shock reduces
demand. It has the same effect as a tax, leading to 
a direct reduction in purchasing power. In the medi-
um term, a classic supply-side effect develops as
manufacturing becomes more expensive and the prof-
itability of production facilities declines. In the long
term, the supply-side effect is amplified as invest-
ment drops, thus reducing the capital stock. If oil
prices remain high for a long time, a substitution
effect is triggered as investment in alternative sources
of energy becomes more attractive.20
Source: Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
18 An application can be found, e.g., in Bernanke (2004).
19 A third channel for oil prices to impact on inflation is through a
change in the terms of trade. This is examined in a separate sub-section
because its quantitative relevance is declining.
20 Whether this makes up for, or even more than offsets, the decline in
investment is a matter for debate. Similarly, there is much controversial
discussion about whether the government should subsidise the search
for alternative sources of energy, by levying an energy tax that increases
or stabilises prices additionally over the market signal.   
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Futures as a forecast of oil prices
16 Remarkably, Graph 10 comes from the CBO (2005, p. 42). 
Nevertheless, the CBO is sticking to its forecast of dropping oil prices, 
in line with futures prices.
17 Chinn, LeBlanc and Coibion (2001) conclude that although futures 
do not provide very accurate forecasts, at least until 2000 (shortly
before the prolonged backwardation phase) the corresponding forecasts
were free of distortion.
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Extent of economic effects
The quantitative correlation between oil prices
and economic growth is complex and highly contro-
versial, and thus will be mentioned here only briefly.
The economic consequences differ according to the
model used and the assumed monetary policy
response. Nevertheless, the conclusions tend to be
similar.21 Accordingly, a USD 10 rise in the price of oil is
expected to cut GDP by just under 0.5% and raise infla-
tion by just over 0.5%.22 Overall, most economists
consider the impact of the recent oil price hikes as
noticeable but in no way comparable to the effects in
the 1970s. Different results can be explained mostly by
different modelling of the monetary policy response
function or by frictions in the labour market. Risk
management considerations frequently lead central
banks to assume stronger impacts so that the esti-
mated growth loss can be seen as an upper limit.
The IEA/OECD  (2004) has simulated a permanent
rise in the oil price from USD 25 to USD 35. The impact
on GDP and inflation was absorbed almost entirely
within a single year. This scenario, which has been
shown to be very modest in the light of the subsequent
hike in oil prices, reduced growth in the OECD countries
by 0.4 percentage points in the first year, and
increased inflation by 0.5 percentage points.23 The SNB
has also simulated various oil price scenarios, includ-
ing more pessimistic ones. The results did not deviate
significantly from the above findings.
Terms of trade: international distribution 
of losses  
An economy’s sensitivity to fluctuations in the
oil price depends on the oil intensity of production
and consumption as well as on its oil reserves.
Although oil intensity is higher in the United States
than in the EU, this is more than offset by the fact
that the US has its own oil reserves. Therefore, it is
mostly assumed that the US’s sensitivity is slightly
lower than the EU’s. Switzerland’s situation is compa-
rable to the EU’s. Although it is entirely dependent
on imported oil, most of its added value comes from
the largely energy-independent service sector. 
The differences in the impact on GDP growth
and inflation rates within the OECD block normally
fluctuate within a narrow range of 0.1 to 0.2 percent-
age points. For some time, the terms-of-trade losses
resulting from oil price rises have tended to be
comparatively low (Graph 11).24 The impact is likely to
be greater in Asia, which is heavily dependent on oil
imports. Moreover, the increased volatility of the oil
price will have an above-average impact on some
specific GDP components. Since globalisation is
reducing companies’ pricing power, higher oil prices
are increasingly likely to be reflected in a reduction in
margins and profitability. Greater oil price volatility
will therefore tend to lead to increasingly volatile
investment and, to a lesser extent, to greater fluctu-
ations in consumer spending. 
21 Cf. Brook et al (2004), OECD (2004) and IMF (2000) and the 
references therein.
22 A price of around USD 30 is normally assumed. Although the example
given here has been confirmed by a number of international studies, it
should be noted that new reduced-form estimates which take asymmetric
effects into account point to a far greater drop in GDP – cf. Jimenez-
Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) and Hamilton (2003). The increased
impact of reduced-form models could be due to their increased emphasis
on the supply channel. As little research has been carried out on the
form and stability of these non-linearities, the results are controversial.  
23 A comparable analysis by the IMF (2000) came to a similar conclusion,
as did an analysis by the OECD (Brook et al., 2004) assuming a USD 15
hike in the oil price. 
24 Sensitivity to oil price shocks also depends on the dollar exchange
rate. Most market commentators assume that the dollar will weaken
(Factor 11), thus making oil imports less expensive and cushioning the
impact of the higher price of oil in dollars. 
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Declining terms-of-trade losses in the OECD following an oil price rise
Source: OECD, 2004
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The asymmetric effect of oil price shocks
Another interesting macroeconomic question 
is whether an economy returns to its initial position 
if oil prices rise but subsequently drop back to their
initial level. In other words, does a temporary rise in
the price of oil have a sustained or a temporary
impact on the economy? 
Empirical evidence suggests that the reduction
in growth caused by higher oil prices exceeds the
increase in growth generated by declining prices.25
This asymmetric effect is mainly due to the fact that
wages respond faster to rising inflation rates than 
to declining inflation (downward wage stickiness).
Higher oil prices pass through into core inflation
more than lower oil prices. This often results in 
a sharper monetary policy response and thus has 
a greater economic impact in the case of rising oil
prices. This asymmetry mainly unfolds in prolonged
periods of price rises/declines. By contrast, if the
increase in the oil price is temporary and the second
round effects are low, once the oil price has receded
again there is normally a surge in growth that makes
up for the previous shortfall. The impact of oil prices
on inflation is of great importance for monetary
policy and is outlined in detail below.
4.2 Pass-through of oil prices 
to inflation
The impact of oil prices on inflation is of central
importance for a monetary policy striving to maintain
price stability. There are numerous indications that
this “pass-though” effect has changed in recent
years. 
Oil prices are passed through directly 
via various products… 
The price of crude oil has a direct effect on
inflation through petrol prices and the cost of heat-
ing. Its impact can be estimated from the weighting
of oil products in the consumer price index (CPI).
Because of different consumption patterns, the
weighting may vary from one country to another.
Because of its use in a wide variety of products (e.g.
plastics), a rise in the oil price affects many compo-
nents of the index.
…increasingly fast…
Oil price rises therefore affect consumers fairly
quickly. Recently, there has been a tendency to adjust
prices faster because it is becoming simpler and
cheaper to do so (lower “menu costs”). As a con-
sequence, fluctuations in the oil price become visible
in the CPI earlier than in the past. Between 1984 and
1996 oil prices impacted the Swiss CPI slowly and the
correlation was still significantly positive even two
years later. In contrast, since 1997, the pass-through
has been completed almost fully within six months.
This does not appear to be excessively fast by inter-
national standards; according to a report published
by the IMF (2000), pass-through effects become
visible faster in the USA than in Europe and Japan.
25 Cf. Hamilton (2003), for example. Hunt et al (2001) present results
for the US, the euro area and Japan with the aid of the IMF’s Multimod.
On the basis of firm data, Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) found that the
impact of a rise in oil prices on the US labour market is ten times greater
than the impact of a decline in the oil price.
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…but to less extent in the CPI
Although the pass-through has become faster,
its impact has declined. This is partly because more
efficient use of energy has reduced the weighting of
energy prices in the CPI. In Switzerland, heating oil
was given a weighting of 2–3% in the 1970s and
1980s. Despite higher oil prices, this had dropped to
1.4% by 2005.26 At the same time, globalisation has
increased competition and thus reduced the magni-
tude of price rises. Other reasons for the declining
second round effects in Switzerland, apart from
increased competitive pressure, are increasing deregu-
lation and, thanks to the low inflation rate in the
1990s, the increased credibility of the SNB.27
Declining pricing power and lower “menu costs”
can be seen by comparing producer and consumer
prices. Between 1984 and 1999 the correlation
between the two was around 0.7. Between 2000 and
2004 this dropped to around 0.5. Moreover, before
the year 2000 consumer prices lagged producer prices
by about 6 months, whereas now they move roughly
in tandem (Graph 12).28 
Core inflation has become more important
for monetary policy
The objective of monetary policy is to maintain
low inflation in the medium term. More volatile oil
prices increase the frequency with which base effects
distort the current CPI. That in turn increases the
importance of core inflation for monetary policy.
Since core inflation disregards such effects, it provides
an insight into the real price pressure in the economy.
Using core inflation means that the dangerous
second round effects of a hike in oil prices can be
distinguished from the initial impact of the price rise,
which is of less relevance for monetary policy. 
Oil prices affect core inflation through
expectations and pay rises
Changes in oil prices affect the core inflation
rate over two channels. The first is through expecta-
tions: Since many contracts (for example, rent con-
tracts) are either implicitly or explicitly linked to the
CPI, a rise in CPI rises expectations of a general rise
in price pressure. In other words, consumers assume
that oil prices will not be absorbed through relative
price shifts, but that the relative price situation will
be restored by a rise in the price of non-oil products.
The second channel follows from the assumption
that, in the face of rising oil prices, consumers will
endeavour to make up for the reduction in their real
purchasing power through pay raises. This can trigger
a wage-price spiral. Empirical studies show that both
mechanisms raise the core inflation rate by about the
same amount.29
Source: SNB
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26 Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS/SFSO, 1966-2005). While 
heating oil has a weighting of 1.36%, crude oil products overall account
for 4.2% of the Swiss CPI.
27 The reduction in knock-on effects resulting from greater confidence
in monetary policy is documented, for example, in Hooker (1999). 
28 Cf. BIS (2005, p. 18ff) on the reduction in the knock-on effects 
of rising raw material prices on import prices and of these on inflation 
in the main industrialised countries in 1990-2004 compared with 
1971–1989.
Evidence that the impact of the pass-through is declining is also found
internationally and in more detailed analyses. For example, Hooker
(1999) applied a Phillips curve approach to the US. This showed that 
oil prices had a major impact on both core and headline inflation 
rates before 1980 and that the influence has dropped off significantly
since then.
29 Cf. Hunt et al. (2001).
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5 Oil prices and monetary policy 
in a new paradigm
The previous sections looked at the factors
influencing oil prices and their impact on the eco-
nomy and inflation. They also addressed the resulting
implications for monetary policy. This section
summarises the relationship between oil prices and
monetary policy and introduces some new aspects.
Our conclusion is that a range of factors point to the
need to alter the monetary policy response. 
An oil price shock confronts monetary policy
with a fundamental trade-off. A restrictive monetary
policy is needed to counter rising inflationary
pressure, while efforts to offset real economic effects
call for a more accommodative policy. The monetary
policy response can therefore have a major influence
on the extent to which higher oil prices impact infla-
tion and the real economy. The extent of this influence
has long been the subject of controversial debates.
This debate has been made more difficult by the fact
that the oil price is increasingly driven by demand. It
is becoming more and more difficult to disentangle
the monetary policy response to an oil shock from the
response to a general increase in inflation. Bernanke,
Gertler and Watson (1997) endeavoured to separate
these effects. They found that the main output effect
is caused not by higher oil prices but by the resultant
tightening of monetary policy.30 Sims (1997) and
Hamilton and Herrera (2000) interpreted these find-
ings to suggest that monetary policy can only prevent
the drop in growth by allowing higher inflation. The
optimal monetary policy answer to oil price shocks is
likely to remain a subject of debate in the future.
However, there are various reasons why a shift in the
monetary policy response can be expected even
though the academics have not yet reached a final
conclusion. These are outlined below:
a) Faster but less pronounced pass-through
effects 
The monetary policy response depends to a large
extent on the second-round effects. If higher oil prices
only have a temporary impact on the CPI, a more
restrictive monetary policy is not needed to check the
risk of sustained inflationary pressure. By contrast, if
the core inflation rate were to rise, this would indicate
second-round effects.31 Monetary conditions would
therefore have to be tightened to prevent a permanent
rise in inflation. Otherwise there are likely to be high
economic costs resulting from a credibility loss for
monetary policy, which could lead to higher inflation
expectations.32
As outlined in section 4.2, the recent oil price
increases seem likely to impact the CPI faster than 
in the past, although their impact may be less
pronounced. Alongside declining dependence on oil,
this is attributable to more efficient use of oil and, in
particular, global competition, which has reduced
companies’ pricing power. Thus, there is less risk of an
oil-price-driven inflationary spiral at present.
b) Stabilisation mechanisms are at work
Another aspect of the relationship between 
the oil price and monetary policy has changed. As
mentioned, the oil market is increasingly demand-
driven. While demand-driven increases make oil
prices more volatile, they also act as an automatic
stabilisation mechanism. A wide range of factors
drive the oil price upwards. At the same time, these
same increases in the price dampen overall demand,
which is one of the main price drivers.33 Although
monetary policy still faces the fundamental dilemma
of whether to counteract higher inflation or lower
growth, it is supported by this automatic stabili-
sation mechanism. Nevertheless, finding the appro-
priate monetary policy response to an oil price shock
remains challenging.
30 However, the authors stress that their findings do not necessarily
indicate a sub-optimum monetary policy. 31 Alongside the various core inflation rates, consumption and 
investment in capital goods are regarded as indicators of knock-on
effects.  
32 Cf. Hunt et al. (2001).
33 Thus, economic normalisation in China, not simply as a result of high
oil prices but possibly also as a result of the new currency regime, would
exert downward pressure on oil prices in the same way as it pushed them
upwards in the boom phase.
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c) The economy is not overheated
A key factor for monetary policy, apart from the
duration and extent of the oil shock, is the economic
environment in which the oil price increase occurs.
One reason why the oil shocks of the 1970s were so
severe was that the economy was booming and close
to overheating. However, the present global economic
situation is dominated by restructuring and consoli-
dation despite high overall growth rates.
d) Reduced impact of increased 
oil price volatility on long-term inflation
expectations 
As a result of the successful monetary policy
efforts of key central banks in recent years, long-
term inflation expectations are well anchored within
the price stability range. Consequently, highly volatile
oil prices are unlikely to have a negative effect 
on long-term inflation expectations. As long as the
central banks continue to pursue a credible monetary
policy, inflation expectations will be held in check.
This in turn reduces the pressure on them to respond
to short-term rises in oil prices.  
e) A lower neutral interest rate 
Sooner or later, global interest rates will return
to a neutral level. However, the question rises
whether they will be lower than in the past. A few
years ago, a constant interest rate was considered to
provide a reasonable approximation of the neutral
interest rate. It is now fairly clear that this no longer
holds true. As shown e.g. by Woodford (2003), the
neutral interest rate can vary over time as a result of
real economic shocks. One such major structural shift
is, in particular, the increase in international compe-
tition – one result of globalisation – as it limits the
scope for price increases. This influences the long-
term interest rate compatible with price stability.
Despite increasing competition, it seems unlikely that
international interest rates can be held at the present
level in the long term. However, unlike in the case of
previous oil shocks, it is necessary to consider that
the neutral interest rate could be lower than in the
past and therefore that the restrictive impact of rais-
ing interest rates could be felt faster than in the past.
6 Concluding remarks
In the light of recent market trends, the oil
price has become one of the most keenly followed
components of the consumer price index. Numerous
driving forces are responsible for the current high
and volatile oil prices. Oil prices affect inflation
through a variety of channels. Various arguments
currently suggest that the monetary policy response
to higher oil prices should be less pronounced than in
the past. These include: pass-through has become
faster but less pronounced, automatic stabilisation
mechanisms are at work, the economy is not
overheated, monetary policy is focused on long-term
targets, and the neutral interest rate can be expected
to be lower.
Does this new paradigm make monetary policy
easier or more difficult? The challenge facing mone-
tary policy, apart from record (nominal) oil prices, is
that international interest rates are still low. The
broad consensus is that monetary policy should show
little or no reaction to oil shocks as long as they do
not affect the core inflation rate. However, that does
not necessarily mean adopting a wait-and-see
approach. If monetary policy gets behind the curve,
inflation expectations are likely to be adjusted. In
the long term, such changes can only be reversed at
considerable real expense.34 In the new paradigm, as
in the old one, monetary policy therefore needs to be
conducted with great care. Swiss monetary policy has
attested broad credibility. That is the result of more
than ten years of price stability and the new mone-
tary policy concept applied since the start of 2000.35
The fact that inflation expectations are well anchored
is probably the most important asset in monetary
policy; given that, asset monetary policy makers need
to be less frightened by a prolonged high and volatile
oil price than in the past. 
34 This prompted Gramlich (2004) to make the much-quoted remark 
that the worst possible outcome for monetary policy practitioners is 
a solution that cuts inflation adrift “from its moorings”.
35 Cf. Gerlach-Kristen (2005).
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